Learning from ISIS's virtual propaganda war for Western Muslims:
A comparison of Inspire and Dabiq

Haroro J. INGRAM[a,b,1]

[a]*Australian National University (Canberra)*
[b]*The International Centre for Counter-terrorism (The Hague)*

Abstract. Islamic State's (ISIS) *Dabiq* English-language magazine has been central to its propaganda war for Western Muslims. This study analyses *Dabiq*, using Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) *Inspire* for comparative purposes, to explore how its narratives are strategically designed to appeal to and radicalise its audiences. It examines how strategically designed in-group, Other, crisis and solution constructs are variously interplayed via value-, dichotomy- and crisis-reinforcing narratives to coax audiences into making rational- and/or identity-choice decisions. It explores how these narratives provide its readers with a "competitive system of meaning" in order to shape their perceptions and polarise their support. This analysis then analyses a range of different strategies and levers that are used in *Dabiq* to boost the appeal of its messaging. It concludes by outlining lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications drawn from the preceding analysis.

Keywords. ISIS/ISIL; Dabiq; propaganda; counter-narrative; counterterrorism.

1. Introduction

The surge in Islamist-inspired foreign fighters and similarly inspired 'home-grown' plots points to a terrorism threat that has grown for many Western nations despite a second decade in which counterterrorism has dominated national security discourse [1]. These trends are, to varying degrees, products of both the effectiveness of propaganda produced by groups like so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the failings of counterterrorism strategic communications efforts. This study analyses how ISIS's propaganda seeks to appeal to and mobilise Western Muslims via its English language magazine *Dabiq* with reference to AQAP's *Inspire* for comparative purposes. It examines narrative trends, how rational-choice (i.e. decisions based on a cost-benefit consideration of options, also referred to as pragmatic-choice) and identity-choice (i.e. decisions based on one's identity) messaging is prioritised as well as the intra-messaging strategies and levers used to appeal to audiences. Based on this analysis, this paper concludes by drawing out some lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications.

2. ISIS's propaganda strategy: Placing *Dabiq* in context

It is essential to position ISIS's online propaganda efforts into the context of not just its propaganda strategy but broader politico-military campaign. Without this context, one risks taking a view of ISIS's online propaganda messaging that is too narrow and miss dynamics that will be important for developing not just a more nuanced understanding of this phenomenon but opportunities to develop more effective strategies for defeating

Islamist extremist messaging. After all, any efforts to counter extremist propaganda online must be synchronised with a comprehensive overarching strategy that will largely occur offline.

How national security threats are understood fundamentally shapes the strategies that are developed to address and combat them. An overemphasis on slick production, social media and graphic violence may not only result in misunderstandings but misguided counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design. What is most important for understanding and ultimately defeating extremist propaganda efforts is the message and the psychosocial forces and strategic factors they are designed to leverage. It is useful to begin by exploring the overarching strategic logic of ISIS's propaganda campaign.

The central purpose of ISIS messaging is to shape the perceptions and polarise the support of contested populations (see Figure 1) [2]. It is an approach that enables ISIS to draw on an extraordinary variety of themes in its messaging while retaining the overall coherence of its campaign [3] [4] [5]. ISIS seeks to achieve this via messaging that appeals to both pragmatic and perceptual factors. Pragmatic factors – like security, stability and livelihood – are drawn upon in communiques that are designed to promote ISIS's politico-military efforts. This type of messaging also seeks to make its audience aware that ISIS does what it says. In other words, that ISIS has a narrow say-do gap. ISIS's appeals to pragmatic factors also tries to show how their enemy's politico-military efforts are ineffective while highlighting the disparity between what these enemies say and do. This messaging is designed to convince audiences of ISIS's credibility and legitimacy as opposed to that of their enemies. This excerpt from ISIS's video *Flames of War* is an example of a pragmatic appeal:

> The Islamic State was now on show for the world to see. The courts were established; prayer was being enforced; the hudood were being implemented; the people were being invited to good; and the zakat was being collected and distributed. Light glowed from the mujahideen, who were soft towards the believers and harsh against the kuffar. This harshness never wavered and was a constant trait of the brothers. So the war on the kuffar raged on. [6]

By drawing on pragmatic factors in their messaging, ISIS seek to compel its audiences to engage in rational-choice decision-making – i.e. decisions based on a cost-benefit balance of options – in their favor opposed to their enemies'.

Figure 1. ISIS's propaganda strategy [7]

Additionally, ISIS draw on perceptual factors by playing upon identity, crisis and solution constructs to shape how its audiences perceive and judge the world (Figure 1). The central narrative of this type of messaging is simple: ISIS are champions and protectors of Sunnis (the in-group identity), ISIS's enemies are evil Others (out-group identities) that are responsible for Sunni crises to which ISIS are the only hope for solutions. Here is an example from *Dabiq* magazine:

> As the world progresses towards al-Malhamah al-Kubra [the battle preceding Armageddon], the option to stand on the sidelines as a mere observer is being lost. As those with hearts diseased by hypocrisy and *bid'ah* are driven towards the camp of *kufr*, those with a mustard seed of sincerity and Sunnah are driven towards the camp of *iman*. [8]

ISIS disseminate this type of messaging as a means to convince its audiences to engage in identity-choice decision-making, i.e. choices made in accordance with one's identity.

As graphically represented in Figure 1, ISIS propaganda tends to emphasise pragmatic factors in messaging to local populations and, at least comparatively, prioritises perceptual factors to transnational audiences. The strategic logic underpinning this trend should be clear: local audiences need to be convinced to support ISIS's politico-military efforts over that of ISIS's opponents. On the other hand, perceptual factors that calls for, for example, Muslims to support 'their' caliphate, that remind Muslims that defensive *jihad* is *fard 'ayn* (an individual obligation) or that frames the conflict as a precursor to End Times, are more likely to resonate with transnational audiences that are outside of ISIS's direct sphere of control.

Regardless of the audience, ISIS's propaganda provides its readership with a "competitive system of meaning", i.e. an alternative perspective of the world compared to that presented by its opponents, that acts as a "lens" through which to shape their supporters' perceptions, polarise their support and, ultimately, convince them to mobilise. After all, if propaganda is done effectively it is more than a mere advertisement, a fleeting

influencer that compels an individual to perceive or act in a certain way before dissipating – it shapes that lens through which the world is understood and judged and actions legitimised and justified. ISIS messaging tends to weave together appeals to pragmatic and perceptual factors which may have the effect of aligning its audience's rational- and identity-choice decision-making processes. The more rational-choice decisions are processed through identity 'lenses', and vice versa, the greater the perceived imperative of that decision as two powerful decision-making processes are aligned. This may go some way towards understanding why ISIS supporters seem to so rapidly transform from ordinary citizens to foreign fighters or lone wolves. These dynamics will now be explored with reference to *Dabiq*.

3. ISIS's *Dabiq* magazine

This analysis begins by examining how *Dabiq* interweaves rational- and identity-choice appeals using a variety of narratives. To highlight this trend in ISIS messaging it is useful to do so by comparison with AQAP's *Inspire* magazine. In a study published by *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* [9], thirteen issues of *Dabiq* and fourteen issues of *Inspire* were analysed to assess how the architects of these magazines strategically designed in-group identity, out-group identity (Other), crisis and solution constructs and interplayed these constructs via value-, dichotomy- and crisis-reinforcing narratives.[2] Three types of items were identified in these magazines: articles, statements and advertisements. The primary focus of each item was identified based on these criteria:

1. Value-reinforcing messages (vertical arrows, Figure 2) tie the in-group identity to solution constructs and out-groups to perceptions of crisis. This type of messaging is designed to reinforce the in-group's positive values and actions and the Other's negative values and actions. The following quote, by attaching commitment to the in-group identity as vital to achieving the solution, is an example of a value-reinforcing theme: "The time has come for the Ummah of Muhammad… to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonour, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew." [12]

2. Dichotomy-reinforcing messaging (horizontal arrows, Figure 2) tends to either accentuate the contrast between in- and out-group attributes or demonstrate how solutions are required to address crises. By highlighting these dualities, dichotomy-reinforcing messages are used to both generate psychological, existential and socio-political anxieties in the audience *and* provide readers with clear choices between the in-group or Others and solution or crisis. For example, this oft-cited statement from Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi: "…the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of *kufr* (disbelief) and hypocrisy…." [13]

---

[2] This analytical framework has previously been applied to examine the contents of the Taliban in Khuransan's *Azan* [10] and early issues of *Dabiq* [11].

3. Crisis-reinforcing messages (diagonal arrows, Figure 2) typically tie treacherous *in-group* members to *in-group* crises. This type of messaging is particularly pertinent when analysing Islamist propaganda because it reflects a group's *takfirist* proclivities. In this example, ISIS criticise so-called "moderate" Muslims for having "…had their religion diluted and, not surprisingly, are always amongst the first to speak out in any case where the mujahidin display their harshness towards crusaders, attempting to disguise their criticism towards the mujahidin as concern for the image of Islam." [14]


Figure 2. Value, Dichotomy & Crisis reinforcing

Extremist groups deploy a variety of narratives as a means to not only construct their respective "competitive systems of meaning" but strategically compel audiences to apply identity-choice and/or rational-choice decision-making processes. Analysing how ISIS and AQAP prioritise the contents of *Inspire* and *Dabiq* offer important insights into their respective strategic logics.

While the full results are available in the original publication [15], the following results are worth highlighting for the purposes of this paper. Regarding overall trends across the dataset, *Inspire's* most prevalent narratives were value-reinforcing (44.61%) and dichotomy-reinforcing (30.39%). Primary focus trends showed a prioritization of in-group/solution (29.66%) and operational (18.38%) items. In contrast, dichotomy-reinforcing (49.79%) followed by value-reinforcing (38.72%) narratives were most common in *Dabiq*. This trend was reflected in the most common primary focus of *Dabiq's* items overall: solution/crisis (32.77%) and in-group/solution (27.23%).

Table 1 features a comparative breakdown of primary focus by item type in *Inspire* and *Dabiq*. Articles trends are significant because they represent the most common item type in both magazines. *Inspire's* articles are dominated by in-group solution (27.51%) and operational (24.02%) messaging. *Dabiq* appears balanced across in-group to solutions (26.85%) and the two types of dichotomy-reinforcing messaging:

solution/crisis (23.49%) and in-group/Other (21.48%). Statements, which are slightly larger items, were dominated in *Inspire* by identity-choice messaging specifically those comparing in- and out-group attributes (42.86%), those attaching Others to crisis (22.22%) and those attaching the in-group to solutions (19.05%). In contrast, *Dabiq* was dominated by solution-crisis messaging (54.55%), mostly photo reports about ISIS politico-military operations.

Item type	Primary focus	*Inspire* number (%)	*Dabiq* number (%)
Article	In-group/Solution	63 (27.51%)	40 (26.85%)
	Other/Perceptions of Crisis	27 (11.79%)	18 (12.08%)
	In-Group/Other	33 (14.41%)	32 (21.48%)
	Solution/Perceptions of Crisis	30 (13.10%)	35 (23.49%)
	In-group/Perceptions of Crisis	9 (3.93%)	20 (13.42%)
	Combination	12 (5.24%)	4 (2.68%)
	Operational	55 (24.02%)	-
Statement	In-group/Solution	12 (19.05%)	19 (24.67%)
	Other/Perceptions of Crisis	14 (22.22%)	6 (7.79%)
	In-Group/Other	27 (42.86%)	8 (10.39%)
	Solution/Perceptions of Crisis	8 (12.70%)	42 (54.55%)
	In-group/Perceptions of Crisis	-	2 (2.60%)
	Combination	2 (3.17%)	-
	Operational	-	-
Ad	In-group/Solution	46 (39.66%)	5 (55.56%)
	Other/Perceptions of Crisis	20 (17.24%)	3 (33.33%)
	In-Group/Other	7 (6.03%)	-
	Solution/Perceptions of Crisis	19 (16.38%)	-
	In-group/Perceptions of Crisis	3 (2.59%)	1 (11.11%)
	Combination	1 (0.86%)	-
	Operational	20 (17.24%)	-

Table 1. Comparative breakdown of primary focus by item type, *Inspire* and *Dabiq* [16]

It should be very clear from this analysis that *Inspire's* contents are dominated by identity-choice appeals – those messages that compel its audiences to make decisions based on what is appropriate from the perspective of adopted identity constructs. *Dabiq's* contents, in being more balanced between identity-choice and rational-choice appeals,

may have the effect of aligning powerful decision-making processes in its audiences and, in doing so, have the effect of accelerating radicalisation towards action.

Two other findings are crucial. Firstly, both *Inspire* and *Dabiq* prioritise empowering messages that tie the in-group to solutions compared to messages that link enemies to crisis. This finding reflects that of other studies [17] that suggest violent groups prioritise empowering narrative to drive supporters towards mobilisation rather than risk paralysing them with the extent of the Other induced crises. Secondly, crisis-reinforcing narratives are over three times as prevalent in *Dabiq* compared to *Inspire*. This reflects the comparative prominence of *takfirist* (i.e. accusing fellow Muslims of apostasy) narratives in ISIS propaganda.


Figure 3. Cyclical cognitive reinforcement

Both the diversity of *Dabiq's* narratives and its prioritisation of certain narratives over others is designed to harness extraordinarily powerful psychosocial forces for its readership. One of the most important is 'cyclical cognitive reinforcement' which is the self-perpetuating cycles of justification that extremist propaganda seems designed to fuel. As graphically illustrated in Figure 2, the more the in-group is seen as benevolent and pure, the more the Other is seen as evil and through these identity constructs the more solutions are linked to the in-group and crisis to the Other. At the most basic level, by exacerbating perceptions of crisis and tying this to solutions ISIS (and other extremists) seek to convince its audience – whether a local in Iraq's Anbar province, a couple in California or a young man in Sydney – that extreme crisis requires extreme (violent) solutions. This diversity of messaging is also designed to act as 'hooks' because ISIS seem to be aware that if one issue, perhaps its despair at the *ummah's* treatment or the dreariness of western life, can catch the attention of a potential supporter, its messaging is so intimately tied together that it may create cognitive openings for other aspects of its messaging which, in turn, may trigger this self-reinforcing domino effect.

4. Dabiq's strategies and levers

It is useful to briefly consider the sheer array of different strategies and levers used by ISIS in *Dabiq*. For the purposes of brevity, this study focuses on five in particular.

Firstly, stylistics seem to be crucial to the architects of *Dabiq*. For example, *Dabiq's* language if much more formal than the typically colloquial, even casual, *Inspire*. To reinforce this sense of authority, *Dabiq* flood its contents with quotations, mostly from *hadiths*, to such an extent that the typically unidentified author's words are often used only sparingly. On a reader unaware of the nuances of Islamic jurisprudence, *Dabiq's* contents must appear inherently credible.

Secondly, ISIS's counter-narrative strategy does more than merely respond to their adversaries' words with waves of counter-messaging. ISIS deploys messaging that is designed to proactively prepare its supporters for their rival's critiques. It is a strategy that means that when ISIS deploys defensive counter-messaging it can start with an often unspoken "we told you so" [18].

Thirdly, behavioral levers that any ad man would recognise are peppered throughout *Dabiq*. For example, presenting profiles of fellow westerners fighting for the so-called caliphate in its regular "Among the Believers Are Men" section is designed to not only inspire supporters towards action but act as catalysts of social norming: "this is what you should be doing as a member of our collective" [19]. One of the most blatant examples of using social norming is in *Dabiq's* appeals for its supporters to promote their pledges (*bay'ah*) of allegiance to ISIS: "It is necessary that *bay'ah* becomes so common to the average Muslim that he considers those holding back as grossly abnormal" [20].

Finally, ISIS cross-promote their messaging as a way to maximise the *reach*, *relevance* and *resonance* of their campaign and drive its audiences deeper and deeper into the complex psychosocial minefield of its own strategic design. More than mere cross-promotion, ISIS's *Dabiq* is designed to fit into ISIS's broader propaganda and politico-military campaign strategy. Consider, also, how *Dabiq's* architects are careful to ensure that their message is synchronised with the chosen format (i.e. an online magazine), its primary communication *medium* for dissemination (i.e. the internet) and the *messengers* used to deliver that message are chosen for their credibility. This interconnectedness of the ISIS propaganda campaign, of which *Dabiq* is a component, is a major factor in the apparent efficacy of its propaganda efforts. However, this could also be used as a source of weakness through effective counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design.

5. Learning from the enemy

There is an extraordinary array of lessons pertaining to campaign and message design that could be drawn from the propaganda efforts of Islamist extremists. However, as graphically represented in Figure 4, the main overarching lessons is arguably rooted in taking ISIS's playbook and reversing it. This approach would involve an overall campaign and message design that focuses on framing ISIS as responsible for the crises afflicting Muslims (but also the community more broadly), exposing ISIS's say-do gap, attaching government strategic-policy and politico-military efforts to solutions and

highlighting where the government has a narrow say-do gap. Indeed, these core elements should be central to the overarching narrative of the counterterrorism strategic communications campaign: *extremists like IS and AQAP have created and worsened crises, no more so than for Muslims, while government efforts have done much more to domestic and international crises*.


Figure 4. Counterterrorism strategic communications

To these ends, it is essential to also address perceptual factors with identity choice messaging. But a strategy based on western governments launching a counter-proselytizing campaign (dictating what is and is not legitimate or true Islam) is more likely to be counter-productive. Such an approach is more likely to contribute to the dichotomous worldview presented by extremists. Instead, government messaging should emphasise the diversity and multiplicity of identities inherent to all individuals and groups. The principle is simple: do not fight a black and white worldview with black and white but color.

These basic principles have a much better chance at undermining the veracity of ISIS's propaganda claims, especially its ideological ones. It is an approach built on available evidence and a multidisciplinary understanding of the complex dynamics behind what is more likely to be effective while avoiding what is less likely to be effective. Rather than championing a crude tit-for-tat rebuttal of argument and counter-argument, it is a strategy that focuses on dismantling the linkages extremist narratives draw between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis. After all, there is no single factor that explains the appeal of ISIS messaging because the strength of ISIS propaganda lies in the cumulative impact of a broad and diverse range of strategies and levers. The strength of ISIS propaganda lies in its deep interconnectedness. Indeed, the counterterrorism strategic communications principles identified here are designed to use the strength of ISIS propaganda (i.e. the deep interconnectedness of all its parts) against it.

With reference to Figure 5, there are an array of macro-, mezzo- and micro-level considerations that are vital to the success of a strategic communications campaign [21].

At a macro-level, Western governments need to ensure that the basics of a good strategic communications campaign are satisfied via the 3Rs: make sure the message *reaches* its audience, is *relevant* by being timely and drawing on situationally pertinent issues and ensure the message *resonates* by leveraging deeper psychosocial forces and strategic factors. These should be aligned with mezzo-level considerations which are designed to facilitate the macro-level factors. Identifying a range of communication mediums to disseminate the message – not just the latest (e.g. social media) – is essential not only to maximise *reach* but *relevance* and *resonance*. How a message is communicated encapsulates not only the communication medium but the format (e.g. written, aural, visual, etc.) used for that specific message. Careful format selection can either enhance or diminish an otherwise effective message. Of course, the messenger or source of that message needs to be credible or the chances of the message being relevant or resonating is greatly diminished.


Figure 5. Macro, Mezzo and Micro level considerations [22]

Figure 5 identifies three micro-level factors which largely relate to intra-messaging considerations. As explored earlier, designing and deploying a range of rational- and identity-choice messages is vital for ensuring that a counterterrorism strategic communications campaign at least attempts to address an array of potential target audience motivations. A focus on developing effective counter-narrative messaging against extremist propaganda is understandable but potentially misguided. The issue is that counter-narrative messaging is inherently defensive and reactive promising, at best, a neutralisation of the enemy's propaganda efforts. Instead, a prioritisation of offensive messaging – i.e. communiques designed to elicit a response from adversaries – may be more important for stealing momentum in the 'information theatre' [23]. Leveraging the say-do gap is an important theme for both offensive and defensive messaging. Highlighting the disparities between what extremists say and do while promoting where

and how government (and even other anti-extremist) actors closely align actions with words is vital for demonstrating credibility and undermining the credibility of adversaries.

6.   Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to analyse ISIS's *Dabiq* magazine and identify what lessons could benefit counterterrorism strategic communications efforts. It argued that *Dabiq* provides its readership with a "competitive system of meaning" designed to shape their perceptions and polarise their support. *Dabiq* uses a range of narratives, strategies and levers to these ends. What emerged is that *Dabiq's* ability to appeal to and mobilise audiences, much like ISIS's broader propaganda strategy, relies on the cumulative effect of a range of factors. This study concluded by not only identifying lessons for improving counterterrorism strategic communications campaign and message design but how it could be applied against ISIS. These lessons represent a small step towards more effective counterterrorism strategic communications against not just ISIS but future threats too.[24]

References

[1] K. Yourish, D. Watkins,T. Giratikanon and J. Lee, How many people have been killed in ISIS attacks around the world, *The New York Times* (1 July 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html

[2] For more on ISIS's overarching propaganda strategy see H. Ingram, The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* **69/6** (2015), .729-752. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10357718.2015.1059799

[3] For analyses of the variety of themes featured in ISIS messaging see A. M. Fernandez, A.M, Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda networks, *The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings*. **11-12**. (October 2015) http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/10/combating-isis-propaganda-fernandez/is-propaganda_web_english_v2.pdf.

[4] C. Winter, The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy, *Quilliam* **22-27** (2015), http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf;

[5] A. Zelin, Picture or it didn't happen: A snapshot of the Islamic State's official media output. *Perspectives on Terrorism* **9(4)** (2015), 90-94.

[6] Flames of War. 2014. Al Hayat Media, video. Transcribed by author.
    Available here: http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/isis-releases-flames-war-feature-film-intimidate-west#

[7] This graphic was originally published in H. Ingram, The strategic logic of Islamic State information operations, *Australian Journal of International Affairs* **69/6** (2015), 735.

[8] Unidentified author, The extinction of the grayzone, *Dabiq* Issue **7** (2015), 66.

[9] H. Ingram, An analysis of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's propaganda war, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (2016) [Pre-released online].

[FN] This analytical framework has previously been applied to examine the contents of the Taliban in Khuransan's *Azan* [10] and early issues of *Dabiq* [11].

[10] H. Ingram, An analysis of the Taliban in Khurasan's *Azan* (**Issues 1-5**), 560-579.

[11] H. Ingram, An analysis of Islamic State's *Dabiq* magazine *Australian Journal of Political Science*. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10361146.2016.1174188

[12] Unidentified author, Khilafah Declared *Dabiq* Issue **1** (2014), 9.

[13] Unidentified author, Khilafah Declared *Dabiq* Issue **1** (2014), 10.

[14] Unidentified author, The burning of the murtadd pilot *Dabiq* Issue **7** (2015), 6.

[15] H. Ingram, An analysis of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's propaganda war, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 2016 [Pre-released online].

[16] H. Ingram, An analysis of *Inspire* and *Dabiq*: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's propaganda war, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 2016 [Pre-released online].

[17] For example, A. Smith From words to action, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* **27(5)** (2004): 409-437.

[18] For example see 'Misleading scholars'. 2014. Dabiq (Issue **6**). Al Hayat Media, 38.

[19] For example, Unidentified author, Among the Believers Are Men, *Dabiq* Issue **14** (2016), 50-51.

[20] Unidentified author, "Foreword" *Dabiq* Issue **2** (2014), 3.

[21] For the full analysis of this macro-, mezzo- and micro-level framework see H. Ingram and A. Reed. Lessons from history for counterterrorism strategic communications *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague* **7/4** (2016). http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf

[22] This graphic was originally published in H. Ingram and A. Reed, Lessons from history for counterterrorism strategic communications, *International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague* **7/4** (2016): 4. http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf

[23] This was explored from an historical perspective in H. Ingram, A brief history of propaganda during conflict: Lessons for counterterrorism strategic communications, *The International Centre for Counter-terrorism – The Hague* **7/6** (2016). http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Haroro-Ingram-Brief-History-Propaganda-June-2016-4.pdf

[24] For the full strategic framework: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ICCT-Ingram-A-Linkage-Based-Approach-Nov2016.pdf For an analysis of the strategic framework's rationale: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ICCT-Ingram-The-Strategic-Logic-of-the-Linkage-Based-Approach.pdf